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PLURAL VIEWS, COMMON PURPOSE: ON HOW TO
ADDRESS MORAL FAILURE BY INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL ORGANISATIONS
LYNN DOBSON
Abstract: International organisations are actors capable of bearing moral
responsibilities and ought to be accountable for their failures in doing so.
However, we should understand these responsibilities and respond to their
failures in the light of fuller considerations about morality and the common
good. The article argues that the international community should ensure victims
are attended to, but also that defaulting institutions may themselves need
rehabilitation for different kinds of international common purposes to be
achievable. Further, the ways in which both goals are agreed and undertaken
must recognise multiple perspectives, else the possibilities for durable peaceable
cooperation internationally will be damaged. Even in a world of plural views,
we can find sufficient proximity on matters of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ to move toward
further agreement. Drawing on Braithwaite, Rawls, and Sunstein, the article
argues we should search out and build on such ‘islands of agreement’ on
wrongs in international life and on mutually respectful ways of responding
to them.
Keywords: Agreement, common good, international, moral, plural
Specifying the Problem
Let us suppose that there is a class of events in international affairs with
the following features. First, they provoke a widespread sense within the
international public sphere that a wrong has been, or wrongs have been, done:
that something regrettable has occurred, the cause of which at least in part
is human action. Second, the nature of the wrong or wrongs are generally
understood to be (at least in part) moral: harm has occurred, as a result of acts
or omissions with respect to which attributions of moral responsibility apply.
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Third, international organisations appear to be significantly causally implicated,
in particular by being the main actor(s), or being amongst the main actor(s),
involved.
The aim of this paper is to explore what, should there be such instances,
ought to be done, specifically in respect of the culpable institutions. I make
no empirical assertions about the incidence or prevalence of events like these;
indeed, the argument, being hypothetical, does not require that there actually
be any. Thus, the general structure of claims developed through the course of
this article should be assessed independently of judgements about how closely
or otherwise international politics throws up situations conforming to my list
of features. Nonetheless there are actual events (or sets or series of events) in
international life sufficiently like those I have outlined to illustrate the kind of
situation I have in mind. Consider the following three short scenarios:
Srebrenica
In July 1995, during the civil wars that achieved the dissolution of Yugoslavia,
the municipality of Srebrenica fell to Serbian forces. In little more than a
week some 8,000 unarmed Bosnian Muslim men and boys were slaughtered
en masse and an unknown number of Bosnian Muslim women and children
raped. The victims were supposedly under United Nations (UN) protection in
a UN-designated ‘safe area’, and were attacked under the noses of the UN force
mandated to protect them – 150 lightly armed Dutch troops. The instigators of
the policy of so-called ‘ethnic cleansing’, Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic,
have since been indicted for war crimes by the International Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia. But the UN’s Secretary-General reported to its General
Assembly that the Bosnian Muslims had been ‘left largely defenceless as a
result of an arms embargo imposed upon it by the United Nations’ – this, allied
with political negotiations with the Serbs that ‘amounted to appeasement’ and
repeated public declarations that ‘we did not want to use air power against the
Serbs except as a last resort’ had provided the conditions allowing Srebrenica
to happen (UN General Assembly 1999: 104–7). To these failings were added
command and control problems, decisions that were ill-advised, failure of
intelligence sharing, incomplete and inaccurate information, lack of capacity,
and inflexible management in the field. The Secretary-General lay responsibility
on the Security Council, the Contact Group and other Governments, the UN
Secretariat, and the mission in the field, UNPROFOR and Dutchbat.
Oil-for-Food
In 1995 the UN established a programme allowing Iraq, subject to sanctions
since the end of the first Gulf War, to exchange oil for food and medicines, in
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hope of its meeting its nationals’ humanitarian needs in a way that precluded
the military rearmament of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Critics charged that the
programme impacted adversely on the vulnerable populations it was supposed
to be helping, claims partly substantiated by a finding that much of the food
imported under its aegis was unfit for human consumption. On the other hand,
by the time the programme was wound up in 2003, Iraq had succeeded in using it
as ‘a tool of foreign policy and a sizeable source of illicit revenue’ (Independent
Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme 2005b: 4)
having made over US$1.7 billion through widespread abuse and corruption
involving well over 2000 companies (including major western corporations).
Noting that the Security Council, the Secretariat, and nine UN agencies were
involved, a Report issued in 2005 by an independent commission chaired by Paul
Volcker found UN failures with respect to leadership, the dilution of authority,
evasion of personal responsibility at all levels, unfit administrative structure and
personnel practices, the absence of a sufficiently strong ethic, and an absence
‘too often’ of competence, honesty, and accountability. A variety of other private
and public actors have also come under the spotlight (Independent Inquiry
Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme 2005a).
Bhopal
On the night of December 3, 1984 a plant owned by the Union Carbide
Corporation in Bhopal, a city in the state of Madhya Pradesh in India, leaked
forty tons of methyl isocyanate. Overnight nearly 600,000 people suffered
exposure to the toxic gas; over 20,000 have died as a result and some 120,000
victims remain seriously and chronically stricken.1 In its 20th anniversary report
into the continuing Bhopal disaster Amnesty International highlighted a slew
of moral (and legal) failures leading to ‘a complexity of violations of civil,
political, economic and social rights for generation after generation’ (Amnesty
International 2004). Most blame is laid at the doors of Union Carbide, its current
owner the Dow Chemical Company, and the governments of India and Madhya
Pradesh. The US Government, Amnesty International suggests, could do more
to ensure its nationals and registered companies fall under the rule of law and
their victims obtain redress. But – and this is the point to note – the report and
its recommendations also point to the contributory shortcomings of a number
of international organisations: the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) and International Labour Organisation (ILO) it suggests,
are impotent in securing accountability by transnational corporations, and the
UN Commission on Human Rights could work harder at clarifying and ensuring
implementation of normative responsibilities.
Before moving on to the substance of the argument that the article
is concerned with let me dispel at the outset some otherwise probable
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misunderstandings. So, by ‘international public sphere’ I mean only, in a
somewhat loose way, international actors and attentive publics such as state
actors, international non-governmental organisations and civil society-type
groups, media and academic commentators, and lay observers such as ordinary
citizens. By saying that the perception of a wrong having been done must be
general and widespread, I am defining the boundaries of the problem at issue
so as to exclude those perceptions of a wrong that are, or could on the face of
it be reasonably suspected to be, partisan. Drawing the boundary that way also
screens out of the analysis those cases where controversy exists over whether
there is in fact a wrong to point to (as, for example, in the disputes over whether
the World Bank helps, or on the contrary harms, the developing world).
Now, though quite different from each other in many ways these three
scenarios have a number of features in common. First, there is a general
view – held amongst not only members of the international states system
but also other parties to or observers of international life – that in each case
something unintended, undesirable, and regrettable, occurred. Disagreement
over the details of any such wrong accompanies widespread agreement on
its existence. Secondly, in the instances given this consensus goes beyond
recognising the fact of wrongness per se and extends into agreement that
persons, or important goods, values, or interests, have been harmed, and that this
is as a result of acts or omissions for which attributions of moral responsibility
are appropriate. Thirdly and crucially, in each of these scenarios international
organisations are implicated. Certainly each of the cases throws an unflattering
light on individual persons, states and states’ organs, and private corporations
(both profit-making and ‘not for profit’), and there is still evidently much work
to be done on the question of the moral responsibilities of such actors and how
their failures ought to be dealt with. But my particular concern in this essay will
be international actors of another type – the kind of common public political
organisation of which in these scenarios the OECD, the ILO, and the UN and
its parts are representative examples. They are seen to have been involved in
ways that invite censure, not only because individual officials may have behaved
badly, but because there are systemic weaknesses or acts or omissions for which
collective organs, rather than or as well as individuals, are culpable. Other kinds
of actors are likely to be implicated too, and it may be that parts of the argument
I shall propose are extendable to them. But I do not reflect on that here. The
argument is proposed only in relation to international bodies as specified.
At present there are no common understandings around whether such breaches
should be responded to or dealt with, let alone how. Yet, to have no methods for
dealing with moral failure by common institutions in the international arena even
proposed is hardly a satisfactory state of affairs. In particular, what objectives a
response should be trying to achieve, and why those objectives are the right ones,
are puzzling. This is of course both a theoretical and a practical problem. But in
fact the problem is further-reaching than that: we are not simply undecided about
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what the solution to it ought to be, but are unclear at a more basic and prior level
about what considerations any putative solution ought to be responding to.
The International Context
My starting point is to identify the most normatively salient factors, and then
indicate their implications. There are, it will be claimed, four features to take
into account, and taken together they point the way forward in clarifying what
objectives a response to culpable institutions ought to be aiming at.
International Organisations as Moral Actors
In considering moral faults by international political bodies one question is
whether such international corporations can count as being the kind of actor
to whom moral responsibilities may reasonably be attributed. Additionally, in
the light of events like the three outlined and the widespread unease with
the workings or decisions of public organisations they prompt, some scholars
of international relations have begun to wonder whether it is possible to
formulate common (i.e. international) responses, or a set of principles to guide
such responses, to ‘delinquent’ international institutions. The relevant literature
construes the central question as being whether organisations can be moral
agents (Ethics & International Affairs 2001; Erskine 2003, 2004a, 2009). It is
claimed that (a) if agency is not attributable to such organisations then they
cannot be held to be the assignees of duties nor responsible for discharging duties
nor held accountable for failures to discharge moral duties, and (b) that some
corporate bodies meet core tests of agency – principally capacities of reflection,
deliberation, and decision (Erskine 2001, 2004b, 2008a).
It seems clear that whether or not we want to employ the terminology of
agency – with all its ambiguities and difficulties – with respect to organisations,
we already act as if it made sense to consider them as corporate actors capable
of formulating and executing plans with purposes that are morally infused and
outcomes that can be normatively assessed – hence the breast-beating in the
Reports summarised earlier. If an attribution of actorhood (as distinct from
moral ‘agenthood’) along these lines is, as I suppose, sufficient to establish
their liability for moral tasks and accompanying responsibilities, that is as much
as we need in order to get discussion going. In specific cases, what would
then stand in need of establishing would be the attribution of morality-bearing
actorhood to specific organisations. Nevertheless, in effect, the possibility of
such attribution is already presupposed by our enquiry. Within the hypothesis
this is by stipulation. In real life, such attribution is both presupposed and
brought to our attention by the indignation with which we greet outrages like
Srebrenica and ask what is to be done.
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Let us advert to a famous essay, ‘Freedom and Resentment’ (Strawson 1962,
1982). In it Strawson notes that someone may cause us to suffer pain or enjoy
benefit, but it will only fuel resentment or indignation or gratitude where we
think it goes along with certain attitudes or intentions towards us held by that
someone. Vicariously, these feelings are generalisable beyond our own personal
experience, so that where a third party is done good or ill by another in ways
signalling certain attitudes (perhaps about the third-party specifically or about
ways of treating people in general) we feel moral approval or moral indignation.
It is our having these feelings, vicariously or otherwise, that alerts us to the
possibility that a moral breach may have occurred. Strawson’s point is that the
catalyst for certain kinds of moral judgements to come into play is not the harm
or benefit simpliciter, but the stance that it implies its perpetrator takes towards
whoever is harmed (or benefited). When these morally reactive emotions arise,
we are viewing ourselves and the putative culprit as participants in a joint moral
community, one in which intentions and the feelings to which they give rise
are mutually understood and in which neither party is placed beyond the reach
of moral expectation. Registering these reactions does not conclude matters, of
course, since we will still need to investigate and employ rational evaluation to
see if the moral disapproval we feel in response to an act is well-founded and
appropriately directed.
In the sorts of cases in international politics I have outlined, we react with
the kinds of moral indignation and outrage of which Strawson reminds us. On
these occasions it is not just that we recognise that harm has been done, but we
feel it ought not to have been done, and without the wrong kinds of attitudes
or inattention or intention, it would not have occurred. Where an event in inter-
national politics meeting with widespread repugnance occurs, we should take
this as a prima facie case of an act or omission for which the actor, should their
fault be confirmed on fuller examination, ought to be held morally accountable.
While therefore it may be true that it is difficult to assign duties to international
organisations and hold them accountable for fulfilling them, the difficulties
seem to be rather about practicalities than about the principles of attribution.
International Organisations as Multilateral Conglomerates
International organisations are corporations of corporations. Internally, they may
be made up of all sorts of relatively discrete bureaucracies. But in thinking
about the attribution of responsibilities the key relationship is that between the
corporate bodies and the members composing them. Now, there are some well-
known bones of contention here to do with structure and agency, and individual
and collective, to get out of the way. For example, if collective subjects like the
UN Security Council are no more than the sum of their parts, as some might
wish to claim, holding the corporate body responsible for a moral failure may be
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no advance on holding each of its members individually responsible. If common
institutions such as the EU Commission are no more than the instruments of
constituent powers, as some might wish to claim, then holding such bodies
responsible for a moral failure may similarly be no advance on holding their
political masters to account. There is of course something to these objections:
political actors and powers can, and there are well-founded suspicions that they
do, exploit the alibis and the aliases that acting together opens up to them. Still,
conceptually speaking corporate bodies are more than, and not reducible to, the
sum of their parts – that is precisely what is indicated by our choosing words
like ‘corporate’ when we might instead have said ‘aggregate’. Equally they are
not independent of those parts, and indeed the parts – if they are themselves
actors capable of formulating wills – may individually or collectively exert
strong constraints on the autonomy of both types of corporate body. In aiming
to discover patterns of responsibility for particular morally flawed outcomes in
the context of international institutionalisation, methodological dogmatism on
questions of structure and agency, individual and collective, is almost certainly
not the best starting point.
Two things are of vital importance for our purposes. First, international
organisations are either conglomerates of political entities – sovereign member
states – from which their authorisation is entirely derived, and which are
themselves (formally, at least) the authorised representatives of their
populations; or they are separate bodies created and maintained by such
sovereigns and endowed by them with discretion and authority to act. Insofar
as international organisations wield authority it is delegated. While they have
(sometimes extensive) capacities for reflection, deliberation, and the unification
and execution of will, those capacities stretch no further than the limits of the
space allowed to them by their members, the pouvoir constituants. As a result
both types of organisation, even if they are powerful bodies enjoying significant
opportunities for political entrepreneurship, lack recourse to an independent
or sui generis source of authorisation. Their authority is derived from and
dependent (in the final instance) on that of their members. Second, and further,
this constitutive authority is structurally polycentric. The component members
of multilateral conglomerates are, with respect to each other, anarchical. They
are formal equals, they are not ordered in a formal hierarchy, and there exists no
superordinate body of authority to which they must defer.
Common Good
We began from the notion of a common recognition of wrong, opening up
the possibility of widespread agreement on ‘the bad’. As well as this, most
observers would likely agree that in international life responsibilities, rights,
and duties are unassigned or under-assigned, and may be inchoate, ill-defined,
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and contested, and that authority to investigate and remedy harms is dispersed,
unavailable, or ambiguous. Adverting to Strawson’s insight, that many different
kinds of international observer can share or converge on substantive ‘bads’ and
instrumental shortcomings at least implies their opposites – the existence of
widespread if shallow ideas of ‘common good’, and of procedures consistent
with it. Indeed, I would go further and contend that part of the reason
why international organisations’ failures to uphold their moral responsibilities
provoke in us the morally reactive emotions identified by Strawson is that as
a class those institutions’ justifications appeal ultimately to their contribution
to ‘good’. It provides what most of us unreflectively take to be the strongest
rationale for such organisations. By this I do not mean to imply that the
international community has a shared conception of ‘the Good’ in some
comprehensive sense of which either the universe of international institutions,
or any particular institution, is constitutive. Rather, as intermediary institutions
international organisations are expected to be other-regarding more than they are
self-regarding, and often to serve extensive, even global, constituencies. Taken in
the round and over the longer term, international organisations both individually
and collectively are presumed to make a net contribution to human well-being.
(This presumption can be overridden by evidence to the contrary and sometimes
is.) That is why their failures are peculiarly disturbing: we expect better of the
UN than we do from the Karadzics and Mladics of this world.
If not a comprehensive conception of the good life, then to what good(s)
do international institutions conduce? To begin with, we have strong reasons
to suppose that though formally anarchic, international life and international
politics are in actuality marked by widely understood and largely accepted
rules and norms that import predictability and stability. As Bull wrote, the
international system comprises a common perception of interests served by
enduring structures of co-existence and cooperation, sets of rules to that end,
institutions to facilitate exchanges, and conceptions of secular relationships
conducted (formally at least) on the basis of equality and reciprocity (Bull 1984).
Indeed it is precisely their departure from these customary ways of doing things
in international society that makes actors such as ‘rogue states’ so disturbing to
other international actors (as their name suggests) and shows just how deeply
the everyday tacit dependence of international actors on structures of norms and
expectations in international life is rooted. That is neither to say that such norms
are always adhered to, nor that where they are adhered to, actors adhere to them
for the same reasons, or for reasons that can be given strong moral justification.
But it does show that actors’ behaviour is not chaotic but customarily patterned
and somewhat predictable. In other words, it demonstrates that actors’ behaviour
is rule-governed. Moreover, it shows that these patterns of action and interaction
are often supported by explicit mutual understandings about how actors ought




International political life is one in which, whether they like it or not,
international actors are neighbours. And if conditions tolerable for human lives
are to be met, then over the long run neighbours, as Kant saw, ought to cooperate,
at the very least in order to agree mutually satisfactory terms of relationship and
rules of engagement (Kant 1965, 1991; Waldron 1993: 28). In the absence of
even minimal cooperation over rules and norms, conflict would be not only an
ever-present possibility but, more importantly, could only be resolved by force.
Where actors resist this knowledge and what it implies, we are in a Hobbesian
state of war of each against all. Where actors are rational, on the other hand, in
being able to comprehend the Kantian proposition and willing to act on it, they
will be motivated to try to arrive at common understandings about sets of rules
and norms to govern their interactions. Kant’s moral law and Bull’s international
society are not the same, but they are linked. International institutions are not
only constituents of a society of customary norms, but are also at the same time
located in a moral universe. I don’t mean this as a strong claim about the force,
the similarity, or the ubiquity of actors’ ethical commitments. (Indeed, shortly we
will get on to a discussion about how to formulate action-guiding norms under
conditions of deep dissimilarity in moral perspective.) It is merely to claim that
just as international actors are compelled to live together in the natural world,
so too they are compelled to co-exist in a moral universe, where each will form
and hold moral and ethical expectations of each of the others (although they
are unlikely to hold the same set of expectations) even if the expectation is of
amoral behaviour. And in turn that implies that actors cannot be indifferent to
breaches of norms, and are obliged, as Kant saw, to find a way of reconciling
their different perspectives, despite and because of the difference in perspective,
at least so as to allow them to co-exist tolerably in the future. Both in theory and
in practice, then, it seems that actors’ perceptions of mutual interests in peaceful
co-existence motivate agreement-seeking norms. Given this, there is some basis
for common attributions of right and wrong.
Third, actors can agree that specific international organisations serve common
purposes, for which they have been established, and in pursuing the goals that
the purposes imply also serve a common good. (Here of course it is important
to distinguish a good common to the organisation’s constituents from a general
good, since they may or may not be aligned.) International actors and observers
need not agree in detail on what that common good consists in; they need not see
any particular institution as either constitutive of or instrumental to some shared
comprehensive conception of the good life or the good society. All I suggest
here is the possibility of a shared acknowledgement that, broadly speaking, the
relevant institution serves some limited purpose (or set of purposes) or aims at
some specific objective (or set of objectives) that is valuable to its members
while not harming others, or that is (or could be made capable of being) worthy
of general affirmation and support. In this third instance the good is the purpose
for which the organisation exists, while in the previous two instances discussed
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the value resides in interaction as such and the favourable circumstances (chiefly
predictability) that it makes possible. The distinction is somewhat like that made
by Oakeshott between ‘enterprise’ and ‘civil’ association: in the former persons
are related in virtue of their common aim, but in the latter by nothing beyond the
terms of association itself (Oakeshott 1975).
Substantive purposes pursued by international organisations may be described
as ‘good’ in a more colloquial sense, too, because activities we could
loosely think of as delivering humanitarian values are often core purposes of
international institutions. Even where they are not, such organisations may still
provide goods vital for the well-being of insecure or distressed populations such
as frameworks for cooperation, opportunities for monitoring, stability and order.
Thus as well as right and wrong, there is also some basis for common attributions
of good and bad.
International Interaction and Pluralism
However, a widespread and general sense that something has (morally speaking)
gone wrong frequently fails to be accompanied by a common sense of what the
fault consists in, or how it should be responded to. In international life we are
sometimes confronted by events that are widely perceived as morally wrong.
Usually, from our particular perspective, we are clear why they are wrong.
Usually, from our particular perspective, we do not take the trouble to discover
whether others find them wrong in exactly the same ways that we do; and from
their particular standpoints, others do not query whether we find these events
unacceptable in quite the way they do. We, and they, do not trouble to do this
because it rarely occurs to us or to them that there may be a wide range of reasons
for finding an action reprehensible, and normative emphases may be variously
placed. Since we are all in concordance on the attribution of blameworthiness,
we all usually take the underlying account of why and how the event in question
is wrong to be self-evident. On enquiry, parties may well find they disagree over
what type of wrong it is, or what the wrong consists in, or, where a situation
manifests a number of different wrongs, which of them is worst. In the Oil-for-
Food scandal, for example, commentators from Arabic countries tended to stress
the damage caused by unreliable supply and poor quality of food and medicines
to vulnerable sectors of the Iraqi population, whereas US commentators tended
to stress the damage done by bribery to ethical and professional norms in public
administration and business life. Parties may dissent over the extent of the fault,
or its significance, or who is to blame – as well as why they are to blame, or how
much they are to blame – or even who its victims are (or why they are victims,
or how badly they have been harmed).
As discussed, in international society we assume, for good reasons, a set
of diverse actors recognising the need to subsist together now and in the
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future within a framework of common and mutually-held expectations about
their interactions, and with adequate motivation to find agreement where
possible. However, such actors do not all adhere to the same substantive moral
theory. On the contrary, the international context is one of sociological and
ethical pluralism. International actors’ subscribing to a framework of mutually
satisfactory norms and recognition of each other as morally liable entities, even
where such norms express value, is not founded on or motivated by a particular
shared moral tradition or overarching conception of the right or the good. We
can presume no convergence on a coherent foundational moral theory and there
are practical obstacles – as well, probably, as normative tensions – to achieving
such concurrence. International society is not riven with dissensus, but the
opportunities for consensus are neither abundant nor obvious. Even where the
assertion of wrongs done might secure broad agreement, therefore, their contents
render them ill-suited to motivate common agreement on what action should
follow. Indeed, the more that cases coming to attention are examined, the more
opportunities for contestation it seems they are likely to present, and the greater
the likelihood of disagreement about them amongst the larger international
constituency. One possible result of this is inaction: when there is no agreement
on how to react, it is so much easier not to. Another is action by a part of
the international community that fails to command the assent of much of the
rest of it, or worse, wantonly heightens mistrust and causes antagonism within
international opinion.
Implications for Reasoning
How do these four contextual characteristics (moral actorhood, multilateralism,
common good, and socio-ethical pluralism) direct our thinking on the problem in
point? First, the presumption that aside from the moral failure under examination
an organisation is a force for the common good speaks against too-hasty a move
to ‘punish’ it. The notion of punishing international organisations is odd, but
we can see how it might be done. Punishment involves harms to interests. So to
punish such bodies, institutional interests that could be harmed would have to be
found. In respect of political institutions, the literature developed for the analysis
of political control (over regulatory authority especially) postulates corporate
interests, too: in self-preservation, obviously, but also the maximisation of
budgets (Niskanen 1973), of managerial discretion (Migué and Belanger 1974),
and of prestige (Chant and Acheson 1972). In broader terms, we might refer
to survival, power, and freedom (or perhaps Hobbes’s motivators – security,
material gain, and glory). These values transcend any particular cohort of
officials and endure over time, so they may properly be seen as the institution’s
interests rather than (or as well as) those of its officials. If a punitive response
to an international organisation’s moral infraction were wanted, it may be
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practically possible to apply punishment through the infliction of one or more
harms to that institution’s vital interests by striking at existing gains or capacities
for further gains along one or more of these dimensions. For example, the
defaulting institution’s scope, status, and resources might be diminished.
But it is one thing to suggest it could be done, and quite another to claim
that it should be done. Why, then, might we hesitate? One reason for caution
is that, as noted, international organisations are not ends in themselves, citizens
of Kant’s kingdom of ends. On the contrary, they are intermediaries between
such citizens. The nature of such international institutions means not only that
they may have many third-party victims, but that they may also have many third-
party beneficiaries. To punish an institution may thus result in the harm falling
also – and perhaps, given their circumstances, much more grievously – on those
innocents whom it serves. Here, it seems, we must contemplate the possibility
that the infliction of punishment on an international institution would bring about
virtue-defeating consequences.
Multilateralism under conditions of anarchy matters because it shifts the
burden decisively toward persuasion. It does so because in these circumstances
there is no ‘über’-sovereign able to make its will prevail with respect to a
particular organisation, and no power or coalition of powers can force their will
indefinitely on others without seriously corrupting commitment to the relevant
institution. If an institution is, on balance, conducing to the common good, then
its continued existence, stability, and powers to continue doing good ought –
prima facie – to be assured. This lays on states the duties to, broadly, do what
is required to support it, and refrain from those actions that would undermine
it. (Such duties are of course defeasible.) Where members treat each other
with mutual respect in deciding on common action within or with regard to a
shared institution, they help to sustain the institution. Where members fail to
accommodate each other’s views satisfactorily, they risk damaging its prospects.
There may be times when to do so is a price worth paying, but members should
keep in mind that it will be paid by others – perhaps tens of millions of others – as
well as themselves. Further, the way associates to an international organisation
treat each other will impact on their relationships in the international community
more generally and feed into the prospects for future cooperation and the
possibilities for, and of, future virtue-serving institutions.
What all this amounts to is that in attempting to respond to moral disasters
such as Srebrenica, Bhopal, and the Oil-for-Food scandal, the international
community faces three sets of moral considerations. The first is the most
obvious: to attend to the (probably urgent) need for repair of and restitution
to victims. The second is the need to craft such responses in ways consistent
with preserving what is of value or potential value in respect of the defaulting
organisation. The third is to attend to both the first and second kinds of tasks in
ways that enhance the possibilities for peaceable and productive relationships
in international life more generally. Responses to infractions must therefore
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not only acknowledge the failure as a moral failure and treat violators in a
way that pays due heed to the full weight of their failure, and do so without
destabilising international life or incurring further moral hazard to co-existence,
but it must do these things in ways that can be affirmed by the greatest possible
variety of perspectives among the international constituency. In short, responses
to actions or omissions by international organisations that are widely thought
of as morally delinquent need to be consistent with differing imperatives. They
must recognise the moral nature of the fault, and they must also recognise the
need to preserve as far as possible what is of value in the set of relationships
that constitutes international society. If we want to respond adequately to the
failures of responsibility of international organisations while reducing the risk
of causing further wrongs or sowing the conditions for future wrongs, we must
take multilateralism seriously in our theory and in our practice.
Towards an Archipelago of Agreement
How might political agreement be secured, under conditions of sociological
diversity? The most celebrated answer to this posits a free-standing convergence
on the right, able to co-exist alongside divergence on the good. In Political
Liberalism and elsewhere, Rawls claimed to find the resources of a political
conception of justice (i.e. his free-standing convergence on the right) in the
actually-existing resources of public cultures in modern western constitutional
democracies (Rawls 1993). Insofar as international society might provide an
equivalent to a domestic public culture, it is doubtful that its cultural resources
could extend so far as to furnish the materials for a convergence on the right to
anywhere near the same extent. In his later Law of Peoples, Rawls tries instead to
arrive at ‘a particular political conception of right and justice that applies to the
principles and norms of international law and practice’ founded on the notion
of public reason (Rawls 2001: 3–7). But public reason, as he construes it, is
not a method of reaching agreement amongst sovereign equals. Instead it is a
test, to be applied to the reasons offered for their actions and decisions by those
who wield power to those subject to it; it is a method for justifying courses of
action already decided upon by power-holders, and all it requires is that power-
holders sincerely think the reasons they offer for their actions are sufficient and
they reasonably think that others might reasonably accept them too (Rawls 2001:
131–7). Rawls’s theory works well as a conception of right and justice by which
those actors who are already committed to the particular conception of public
reason he outlines can test whether the principles and norms of international law
and practice are consistent with that liberal morality, but the theory places no
burden on anyone to engage with others in order to craft, in common with those
others, a conception of the right capable of commanding wider assent. If we
are to take multilateralism seriously this approach will not do. Further, Rawls’s
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belief that agreement on the good is not available leads him to attempt to stabilise
relationships and outcomes through securing agreement on the right. But what if
agreement on the right is unavailable too?
In his discussions of legal reasoning and decision-making, Cass Sunstein
notes that United States’ courts are typically faced with practical cases needing
resolution in the here and now, requiring ‘agreements among people who have
little time and limited capacities, who must find a way to live together, who
believe that values are plural and diverse, and who should show respect to
one another’s most defining commitments (Sunstein 1994: 139; 1996). Usually,
such decisions cannot appeal to basic principles, since these are subject to
disagreement that may be sharp and intractable. Nor can they appeal to abstract
theories, since where these are not altogether lacking among participants they
too will probably be highly contested. Reaching verdicts is constrained by
heterogeneity of moral and ethical reasoning and knowledge among participants,
which precludes consensus on fundamental values. Pressures of time oblige
decisions to be reached before competing principles and theories can be argued
indefinitely. The need for participants to be able to continue to live together
without conflict after the case is decided obliges decisions to be reached in ways
that secure the peace after the legal war is won (precluding, amongst other things,
actors attacking each other’s basic commitments).
In these circumstances, Sunstein claims, decision-making systems that
function well tend to move participants toward agreement on particulars using
the lowest level of abstraction needed to decide the case, so that actors are
enabled to reach a result without needing to know or agree on any general
theory that might account for or justify it (Sunstein 1994: 143–4; 1996: 37–41).
This is possible to do, because people often are convinced that something is
wrong without knowing in any theoretically coherent way why it is wrong, and
because people can be brought to converge on a particular outcome although they
have begun from different foundational perspectives and used different routes
to get there. In other words, well-functioning systems incline actors to adopt
agreements that are ‘incompletely theorised’, as he coins it, with respect to the
right or the good. Furthermore, claims Sunstein, it is a good thing that they do
so. Under conditions of diversity, proximity, and the need to exclude obvious
error, incompletely theorised agreements conduce to stability, cohesiveness, and
reciprocity of respect. They suit a pluralistic moral universe, reduce the costs
of disagreement, are open and supple enough to allow evolution, cope with
limited capacities and bounded rationality, and accommodate precedents better
than approaches starting from general theories (Sunstein 1994: 153–8, 1996:
41–4).
These advantages are if anything heightened once we move away from
democratic forums or from settings where adherence to differing conceptions
of the good are stabilised through convergence on a conception of the right. As
Sunstein notes, incompletely theorised agreements may be especially valuable
47
Lynn Dobson
and important where a consensus on the right does not hold. As we know, in the
international arena neither consensus on ‘the good’ nor on ‘the right’ is available.
It is also clear that certain kinds of collective decision-making in international
life pose similar sorts of difficulties as are found (he claims) in courts of law
in heterogeneous societies. Moreover the pressure at law for a timely practical
outcome, on which all can agree from multiple diverse standpoints, which
preserves potentials for peaceful co-existence among participants in the future,
and which aims to rehabilitate relationships, is almost exactly analogous to the
set of considerations I argued for at the end of the last Section.
There is an element to be added to Sunstein’s account, though, because
in international affairs, while agreements on action will certainly tend to be
incompletely theorised because the agreement on theorisation is itself incom-
plete or absent, agreement on interpretation of the facts is frequently incomplete
too. It is not just that actors start from different underlying philosophical or
religious or ethical premises and commitments that then imply different courses
of action in relation to moral violations; often they have differing assessments
of, for example, which actors are the most culpable. That might be because
the idea of what constitutes culpability in general, or culpability in the case at
hand, is not uniform among them. However, those differences are themselves
not likely to be complete, and this lack of completeness in difference provides
some leverage from which common policy may be constructed. Though actor
a may not agree with actor b that actors c to h are the guilty parties, believing
instead that actors f to k are at fault, they both agree on f to h, and it is by
building on such islands of agreement – including building bridges between
them – that a policy able to command wide consent may be constructed. Note,
too, that in constructing agreement on a course of action in this way, actors open
up additional possibilities to extend and clarify their particular understandings
of ‘wrongness’, and to reframe them in ways that are mutually adaptive.
One question that hasn’t been addressed before now is how responses
to organisations’ moral faults might be implemented and enforced, even
supposing widespread agreement on what shape such responses should take
could be stitched together. There is no single legitimate locus of authority
in the international system – no sovereign of sovereigns – and the multiple
sovereigns populating it apparently have difficulty even establishing what an
uncontroversial common enforcement capacity might look like. Law is weak
in international life. Its coverage is fragmentary and incomplete, and mostly it is
‘soft law’, in contrast to the ‘hard law’ operating within domestic jurisdictions.
For these reasons reliance on more informal modes of regulation and self-
regulation, at least as a first step, can help to begin the process of victims’
and organisational rehabilitation despite there being little or no infrastructure
of enforcement.
John Braithwaite’s suggestion of a regulatory pyramid may help here
(Braithwaite 2002). His idea is that responses to malfeasance by organisations
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should start by appealing to (in this case moral) norms that they could reasonably
be expected to subscribe to, and react to non-compliance by moving a stage
up a pyramid of responses of increasing severity. As the institution fails to
comply with expectations, so the responses escalate, until – if the top of the
pyramid is reached – the institution faces the equivalent of capital punishment.
As Braithwaite notes, an escalated response of this type reduces the probabilities
of over-reaction and under-reaction and is likely to be viewed as legitimate and
fair by all participants including the defaulter, and so is likely to be effective in
changing behaviour.
As to what those initial norms might be, we can make good use of the propen-
sity to agree on outcomes that Sunstein notes. Or we can move to the possibility
of building piecemeal agreement on outcomes that I have noted. That involves
deferring agreement on their underlying rationales, while adopting the Rawlsian
recourse to resources already present in the common culture. But where Rawls
appeals to texts, doctrines, traditions of interpretation, and similar intellectual
desiderata, we can look toward widespread but everyday practices, customs,
and behaviours. One incompletely theorised agreement that might be arrived
at, building up from incomplete agreements, is a resolution that international
organisations found delinquent should (a) restore and repair harms done as far as
it is possible to do so, and (b) be rehabilitated and restored so far as possible to
a place in good standing in international life. Neither of these requires common
commitment to a conception of the right, nor to a conception of the good, but
rather appeals to broad concepts – like repentance and restoration – prevailing
across a variety of cultures, philosophical or otherwise, secular or religious, and
including the major monotheisms (Al-Ghazzali 1990; Lyden 1992).
Making Amends
How could such a resolution be put into practice? A brief illustration of the
sorts of measures that might fulfill requirements may help to make the general
argument more vivid.
Restitution to victims for past damage must be a priority. That may imply
the payment of compensation, the return of things taken from victims, or other
measures to restore the status quo ante or some hypothetical equality that the
culpable act or omission is held to have disrupted. Apology and explanation
should accompany restitution. All of these express respect from perpetrators to
victims, as does helping victims’ voices be heard and showing active concern for
their future well-being. Defaulting organisations should undergo penance. Self-
imposed penances signal to observers that the guilty party acknowledges the
significance of the damage it has helped to bring about in the past. Institutional
penances might include disciplinary procedures that secure demotions, sackings,
monetary fines or criminal charges against specific officials, the surrender of
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areas of managerial discretion, or the loss of powers. A culpable organisation
ought also to be expected to show what measures it is taking to preclude a
recurrence of similar damage in the future. Internal reform to guard against
similar failures of responsibility is crucial – indeed, all the penitence in the world
counts for little if not accompanied by determined reforms to ensure similar
failures of duty are not repeated in the future.
As for organisations re-gaining their former good standing, the assignment
of blame implicitly recognises the culprit as an actor within that universe of
actors of whom we might hold legitimate moral expectations, whose actions
have disappointed. If an organisation was not recognised as a bearer of moral
responsibilities and susceptible to ethical reasoning, then no moral resentment
could be excited by its confounding such expectations. So in requiring that
delinquent organisations ‘make amends’, they are acknowledged as members
of a moral universe who have breached but will, it is anticipated, once again
come to observe common norms. In being prepared to admit moral wrongdoing
and comply with the acts required of them consequently by others, actors
signal their willing conformity to the common set of understandings about
acceptable behaviour that constitutes that moral universe, so showing respect
for the frameworks that pattern international life as well as recognising those
whom it has harmed. So, these are some of the actions the international public
sphere might demand of organisations found blameworthy.
What, however, if early stages of the regulatory pyramid were to be
ineffective? If a delinquent organisation showed no inclination to, or failed to,
make amends? This is where the prospect of escalation to more severe responses
might arise. Because international life is anarchic many of the standard responses
to wrongdoing familiar in the domestic case are, in the international case,
unavailable, or have undesirable unintended consequences. We might be able to
imagine the imposition of equivalents to exile, ostracism or capital punishment
on some international actors more readily than we can on others but by and
large these equivalents are not practical possibilities. Perhaps the embargoes
that constitute ‘sanctions’ in the international community, and ‘containment’
as practised in foreign policy, are the most similar measures. In international
life eliminating the culprit is rarely practicable and perhaps rarely desirable, so
this frequently cannot be even the last resort. Many international bodies have
standing that make it practically and normatively very difficult for others to
decide that they ought to be abolished. Even intermediary institutions such as
international organisations, though dependent for authorisation on states, may
be able to draw on sources of indirect legitimacy that lend weight to the case
for their continuing existence, especially where, as noted before, their activities
are vital to the important interests of third-party beneficiaries and their abolition
would involve moral hazard.
In these circumstances some degree of competitive institutional pluralism
might be useful. Greater functional inter-substitutability among bodies in the
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international arena could allow the possibility of shifting functions vital for
precarious beneficiaries and readily reassigning moral responsibilities should
it be necessary to divest an organisation of its remit. As well as the merits
previously mentioned Braithwaite’s escalating pyramid might supply the added
advantage of securing the time needed for alternative organisations to be
established or prepared to take over the responsibilities stripped from the
delinquent body. To return to the three cases we began with, in dealing with the
failures in responsibility by those international institutions that were identified
in the Bhopal, Srebrenica, and Oil-for-Food cases, we could start by requiring
organisational action to make amends and return the organisations to the
confidence of the international community at large (including us, its attentive
publics). But we would need to be prepared to reallocate their powers and duties
to others should they be unable to demonstrate effective programmes of moral
renewal. Their replacements might even be entirely newly-created institutions.
Conclusion
These ideals are hardly innovative, but if what we want is an incompletely
theorised agreement, they have the merit of an existing international hinterland.
Notions of repentance, restitution, reform, and reconciliation are the common
property of humanity at large, and although different cultures imbue them with
their own distinctive references and meanings, they are not so idiosyncratic
as to be unrecognisable as different versions of the same thing. Hence they
require no underlying agreement on fundamental moral theory. Establishing,
as an international norm, the expectation that international organisations will
make amends for moral failure is a common purpose that could be converged
on by multiple actors for reasons that do not need to appeal to (their varying)
fundamental commitments nor (their differing) conceptions of the good or
the right. Rehabilitation as outlined can be argued for from taken-for-granted
existing practices, and from prudential norms contained within a variety of
traditions of thought, without recourse to a grand theory or coherent set of
abstract propositions. Because of this, participants in international life aiming
to secure multilateral agreements on responses to delinquent institutions need
not set about projecting their own particular theoretical or ethical traditions or
commitments, nor need they challenge or attack others’ fundamental principles.
On the other hand, because ideals around moral repair and rehabilitation can
be supported from a range of different standpoints, they allow space for diverse
actors to hear each other’s articulations of principle. And their doing so helps
to support both the operation of particular organisations, and the background
fabric of basic civility needed to sustain the conditions of tolerable international
co-existence more generally and into the future.
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Doubtless, the stance taken here will be neither as ambitious nor as muscular
as many would like. Critics will object that I began by modelling a situation à
la ideal theory but end by making a proposal that is non-ideal – in the sense
of sub-optimal. Well, perhaps. But everything we know about the moral faults
of international institutions ought to tell us that when it comes to responding to
them the real-world choice is not between non-ideal outcomes or ideal outcomes,
but instead between non-ideal outcomes or inaction. Let us conclude, as an
incompletely theorised agreement, that half a loaf is better than none.
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